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ABSTRACT
Large-n comparative research on committee structures in legislatures is rare.
This paper uses newly collected data to analyse committee structures across
30 legislatures of parliamentary systems which possess strong parliamentary
party groups. It seeks to explain committee autonomy which reflects the
degree to which committees are able to carry out their tasks independently.
The variation in autonomy is accounted for by contrasting the ‘keeping tabs
on coalition partners’ perspective with the congressional theories of legislative
organisation (referred to as distributional, informational, and partisan
theories). The results support the informational and the keeping tabs
perspective. More autonomous committees tend to be found in legislatures
with a relatively high workload and frequent coalition governments. For the
ongoing discussion about the applicability of the congressional theories
outside the US, this study provides support for the usefulness of the US
theories in parliamentary systems of government.
KEYWORDS Committees structures; informational theory; distributive theory; partisan theory; ‘keeping
tabs on coalition partners’
Committees in parliaments
Parliaments around the world rely on committees in their daily operation to
allow for an efficient policy-making process. These deliberative assemblies
established by, embedded within, and linked to the larger deliberative body
consist of a subgroup of legislators across parliamentary party groups. They
are the prime organisational structures for the preparation of plenary sessions
and documents: ‘all parliaments work to a greater extent or lesser extent
through committees’ (Laundy, 1989, p. 96). Committees are purposefully
established creatures of parliaments which are formally appointed to consider
and satisfy a defined organisational need. They are mandated and restricted by
the power assigned to them by the plenum. Together with parliamentary party
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groups, committees are ‘the most important component of legislative organiz-
ation and preference aggregation’ (Saalfeld & Strøm, 2014, p. 372) within leg-
islatures. Traditionally, these two institutions were seen as mutually exclusive:
strong committees were associated with legislatures which have weak parlia-
mentary party groups (such as the US Congress), while legislatures with
strong parliamentary party groups (like those found in parliamentary
systems of government) were linked to weak committees. However, since the
beginning of the 1970s reforms within legislatures of parliamentary systems
induced a ‘trend away from ad hoc arrangements and towards parliamentary
committee systems that are specialised and permanent and replicate executive
departments’ (Shaw, 1998, p. 230, italics in original). Nowadays, a large vari-
ation in committee systems exists, with some legislatures relying on highly
comprehensive and effective committees (Strøm, 1998), even though they
are characterised by the existence of strong parliamentary party groups.
This begs the question: ‘what factors account for the variation in formal
committee structures across legislatures with strong parliamentary party
groups?’ Despite a heightened interest in committees in recent decades,
only a few researchers have turned their attention to analysing the factors
which determine this variation across legislatures. The formal structures of
the committee system need to be taken into account when giving a complete
picture on how parliamentary work is organised in committees. The commit-
tee system and its characteristic features determine the ‘playing field’ for legis-
lators and are not randomly chosen, but purposefully determined. By studying
the formal arrangements we can reach a deeper understanding of decision-
making processes within legislatures.
Theories on legislative organisation – congressional
perspectives and coalition logic
In order to analyse committee structures, we can turn to theories of legislative
organisation. Within this process ‘resources and parliamentary rights [are
assigned] to individual legislators or groups of legislators’ (Krehbiel, 1992,
p. 2). Theories on legislative organisation – of which committees are a
central feature – are mainly developed for the US Congress. The main
theory to explain how parliaments outside the US are organised is proposed
by Martin and Vanberg (2011). The central argument of their theory is that
the organisation of a legislature follows the formation of governments and
is, in particular, influenced by a frequent formation of coalition governments.
Their argument builds on the tension that exists between coalition partners
who are forced to govern jointly, but are held accountable separately at the
next election. To minimise the risk of being ‘overly accommodating in their
dealings with their coalition partners’ (Martin & Vanberg, 2011, p. 3),
parties monitor, or ‘keep tabs’ on, their coalition partners. This has important
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ramifications for the organisation of parliaments. The legislative committee
system is the most important institution in this regard as it serves to
acquire information and solve delegation and intra-coalition problems. The
contribution of Martin and Vanberg is a major breakthrough in terms of
an independently developed, cohesive theoretical framework to understand
parliaments outside the US. However, the focus of the theory limits its appli-
cability. The scope of this theory is on coalition governments, which are a
common occurrence in countries outside the US. It is silent about the organ-
isation of legislatures in countries which experience other governments such
as majority or minority single-party governments and how they influence the
organisation of a parliament. Additionally, the reasoning is based entirely on
the type of government and does not relate the organisation of a legislature to
other institutional and political factors. This justifies broadening our view to
other theories.
The first ones that scholars usually turn to are the ‘congressional’ theories –
commonly referred to as the distributive, informational and partisan perspec-
tive on legislative organisation. Although they were developed for analysing
the US Congress, these theories are the main perspectives on how committees
work. The long-standing research tradition on the US Congress and US state
legislatures needs to be taken into consideration when trying to understand
other cases as well.
The distributive theory (Shepsle, 1978; Weingast, 1979) views legislatures
as decentralised institutions. Legislators are dominated by geographical con-
cerns and are ultimately interested in securing their own re-election. Commit-
tees are primarily arranged to meet these electoral needs and provide
legislators with the means for the distribution of particularistic benefits to
their constituents.
The informational theory (Gilligan & Krehbiel, 1990; Krehbiel, 1990, 1992)
departs from the assumption that all policies need to be enacted through the
consent of the majority of members, but there is ‘substantial uncertainty about
consequences [of policies] upon implementation’ (Gilligan & Krehbiel, 1990,
p. 533). This uncertainty has important ramifications for the internal organis-
ation of legislatures. According to this perspective committees emerge to make
legislative specialisation possible. This minimises the occurrence of unintended
effects. Committees are merely agents of the plenum and purely instrumental.
Both theoretical perspectives assume the absence of partisan organisation
as a major force in the organisation of the US Congress. The partisan
theory, which consists of the partisan procedural cartel theory (Cox &
McCubbins, 1993) and the theory of conditional party government (Aldrich
& Rohde, 1998), argues that legislative institutions like committees and the
rules which guide the decision-making process are an extension of the
majority parliamentary party group. The majority parliamentary party
group is the primary principal of committees to secure its own agenda.
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An overview of empirical committee research
The most widely studied aspect of legislative organisation is committee
member selection. A rich body of literature is available on the US Congress
and US state legislatures (see, e.g. Hall & Grofman, 1990; Hamm, Hedlund,
& Post, 2011; Krehbiel, 1993; Overby & Kazee, 2000; Shepsle & Weingast,
1981). Research on committee assignments outside theUS initially focused pri-
marily on the European Parliament (e.g. McElroy, 2006; Whitaker, 2005; Yor-
danova, 2009) and relied heavily on the congressional framework.With regard
to national parliaments, a number of empirical studies argued that committee
assignments are based on electoral rules or candidate selection procedures
(Crisp, Escobar-Lemmon, Jones, Jones, & Taylor-Robinson, 2009; Stratmann
& Baur, 2002). More recent studies on committee assignments in national leg-
islatures make explicit use of the congressional theories (e.g. Fujimura, 2012;
Hansen, 2010, 2011; Mickler, 2013; Raymond & Holt, 2014).
Although this ‘initial focus on policy preferences and the composition of
standing committees was, in fact, the most logical step in any attempt to dis-
entangle these three theories’ (Martorano, 2006, p. 207) only a few studies
have gone beyond committee assignments. Large-n comparative studies of
formal committee characteristics are scarce. A study on 24 US state legislative
lower houses was provided by Martorano (2006), who applied the predictions
of distributive, informational and partisan theories to the study of formal
committee characteristics. Her analysis of committee autonomy provides
support for the informational perspective. When policy complexity increases,
committee autonomy increases as well.
Outside the US, Mattson and Strøm (1995) conducted one of the first truly
comparative analyses of committee systems in 18 legislatures (see also Strøm,
1998). The authors also draw on the congressional theories of legislative organ-
isation. This study is extended by Yläoutinen and Hallerberg (2008) to include
parliaments in Eastern Europe. Amore recent analysis byMartin (2011) argues
that committees ‘tend to be stronger where the electoral system provides incen-
tives for personal vote gathering, but only when fiscal particularism is the
[mechanism to cultivate a personal vote]’ (Martin, 2011, p. 357). Martin and
Vanberg (2011) demonstrated that committees with a strong policing authority
can be found in those countries with frequent coalition situations.
Hypotheses on committee structures: what explains structural
variation?
Similar to Martorano (2006), this study analyses committee systems using the
concept of committee autonomy. This concept has been used in studies of the
US Congress and state legislatures (Deering, 1982; Martorano, 2006) and par-
liaments outside the US (Atkinson & Nossal, 1980). Committee autonomy
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refers to the degree to which decision-making in committees is influenced by
members and outsiders (Fenno, 1966). It is assumed that committee strength
depends directly on the degree to which they are able to conduct their own
affairs (Atkinson & Nossal, 1980, p. 290).
In order to deduce testable hypotheses on factors which may go together
with particular structures a theoretical framework is developed in the next
section. A general notion needs to be made with regard to the nature of the
argument of this analysis. It is not possible to infer causality regarding why
variation of committee autonomy occurs based on my analysis. This is due
to the nature of the committee systems that are studied, the data that is avail-
able and the variables that are used. The data relies on a ‘snapshot’ of commit-
tee structures in 2013 (more information below). The variation in committee
autonomy is mostly accounted for by institutional variables which are slow-
moving and, therefore, may not lead to rapid changes. I shall use averages
over an extended period to prevent the possibility that outliers may bias the
results. Instead (and given these limitations), this analysis seeks to establish
correlation. It is assumed that over time a match will be established
between the political situation and a parliament.
The partisan theory highlights the role of the majority parliamentary party
group in structuring committees: ‘the extent to which committees are auton-
omous actors in the legislative process depends on the extent of control the
majority [parliamentary party group] wields in the chamber’ (Martorano,
2006, p. 209). Martorano argues that the smaller the difference between the
majority and minority parliamentary party groups, the more likely it is that
the majority parliamentary party group will exert control. However, outside
the special US case, the relationship between the size of governing party
and committee autonomy might be reversed. Sieberer and Müller (2015),
for example, show in their study that governing parties have an incentive to
control the legislative structures to prevent the opposition from using them
for obstruction. A governing party with a higher vote share is better able to
seek legislative reforms to control committee deliberations. Because of the
different institutional setting from the US, this expectation is followed.
Additionally, contrary to the US, coalitions between parliamentary party
groups are common. In order to account for this it is expected that the
larger the seat share of the governing parliamentary party group or coalition
is, the more autonomy will be granted. A general caveat needs to be made with
regard to the usage of ‘fixed’ scores of several independent variables. Commit-
tee structures are less volatile than election results. To account for this,
averages over a longer period of time are used.
Hypothesis 1: A structurally larger relative seat share of the governing parlia-
mentary party group or coalition (across multiple legislative periods) is nega-
tively related to the autonomy of the committee system.
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The distributive theory argues that committees serve the re-election goal of
individual legislators. Committees are opportunity structures which assist
members to achieve successfully their own re-election goals by engaging in
advertising, credit claiming and position taking (see, e.g. Fenno, 1973). It
follows that more autonomous committees are expected in legislatures
where members of parliament (MPs) can rely more strongly on ‘personal
votes’. In other electoral systems, the necessity for highly autonomous com-
mittees is not present.
Hypothesis 2: Electoral systems which allow individual legislators to rely on a
‘personal vote’ are positively related to the autonomy of the committee system.
An additional distributive hypothesis takes the district link of individual MPs
into consideration. Committees are expected to present such incentive struc-
tures in those countries in which individual MPs have a relatively closer con-
nection to a district. The reliance on a ‘personal vote’ is related, but not the
same as the relationship with individual districts. Some electoral systems
allow for a certain degree of personal vote, even though they might lack a con-
nection to districts (see the Dutch Tweede Kamer, which is elected nation-
wide, but uses an electoral system allowing for personal votes).
Hypothesis 3: A stronger connection between individual MPs and districts is
positively related to the autonomy of the committee system.
An adapted reading of the distributional theory highlights outside interests,
other than ‘geographic’ interests, which committees may serve. Committees
are prime organisations to facilitate a communication channel between
members of parliament and external organisations such as interest groups
and their participation in the policy-making process (Helboe Pedersen,
Halpin, & Rasmussen, 2015). Such an ‘institutionalised pattern of policy-for-
mation … in the shaping of economic policy’ (Lehmbruch, 1979, p. 150) is
usually described under the term corporatism. Higher levels of corporatism
are expected to lead to the establishment of more autonomous committees
to facilitate these negotiations (or at least consultations) between the state
and interest organisations during the policy-making process.
Hypothesis 4: Higher levels of corporatism of a country are positively related to
the autonomy of the committee system.
Several studies (Hedlund, 1985; Polsby, 1968) have shown that an ‘increased
demand for public policy also resulted in an overall strengthening of commit-
tee systems in the legislative process’ (Martorano, 2006, p. 211). This argu-
ment is used in this study to hypothesise a relationship between the
workload of a legislature and more autonomous committees. To prevent an
overload of bills, a legislature is expected to grant more autonomy to commit-
tees to solve inefficiencies in the legislative process.
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Hypothesis 5: A higher workload of a parliament (over an extended period) is
positively related to the autonomy of the committee system.
Following the ‘watchdog’ function of committees in the coalition logic per-
spective, a decisive argument for the establishment of autonomous commit-
tees is the occurrence of coalition governments. If this is the case, then
committees are granted the necessary tools to fulfil this task. It is tested
whether more autonomy is granted to committees when coalitions are fre-
quently formed.
Hypothesis 6: Frequent coalition government is positively related to the auton-
omy of the committee system.
Likewise, the establishment of strong committees is predicted to be related to
the ideological distance between coalition partners. When this difference is
structurally greater (e.g. due to a frequent necessity to establish government
coalitions between parliamentary party groups which differ in their ideologi-
cal views), then committees should have more autonomy to offer possibilities
to ‘control the bargain’. As ideological distances between coalition partners
may shift after the formation of a new government an average over an
extended period is used.
Hypothesis 7: The formation of coalition governments with greater ideological
distances between the coalition partners on a regular basis (across multiple
legislative periods) is positively related to the autonomy of the committee
system.
Another argument relates the efficiency of monitoring the government to the
frequency of minority governments. Strøm (1990) suggested that strong com-
mittees facilitate minority governments because strong committees grant the
possibility for opposition parliamentary party groups to influence policies.
This study builds on this argument. It is expected that committee autonomy
will be larger in legislatures where parliamentary party groups are confronted
with frequent minority governments.
Hypothesis 8: A higher frequency of minority governments across an extended
period is positively related to the autonomy of the committee system.
Method of the study
One of the primary goals of this study is to broaden our understanding of
committee structures beyond the special case of the US Congress to cases
which possess varying degrees of strong parliamentary party groups. The
case selection therefore includes advanced democracies with a parliamentary
system of government. The reason for the strong organisation of parliamen-
tary party groups within these cases lies in the relationship that the legislature
has with the executive branch. In such ‘fused power’ systems, the executive
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flows from the legislature (usually from within its own ranks) and relies on the
absence of a parliamentary majority against it in order to stay in power. The
removal from office can occur at any time when the majority of legislators
does not support the executive any more. Both branches of government are
therefore highly dependent on each other. A resignation of the government
usually means a fall of the legislature as well. Owing to this, parliamentary
party groups within the legislature have an incentive to be strongly organised.
A strong internal organisation and cohesiveness allows them collectively to
support the government or bring it down. In order to count as an advanced
democracy a standard measure was employed (> 0.8 on the Human Develop-
ment Index, see United Nations Development Programme (2015)). These
cases do not just include Western countries but also post-communist
countries that exhibit the hallmarks of economic development and democ-
racy, and they include France, which is usually classified as semi-presidential.
Altogether, 30 countries were analysed. In case of bicameral legislatures the
data set comprises the popularly elected lower chambers.1
Operationalising committee autonomy
In order to compare committee systems across multiple countries a meaning-
ful indicator of committee structure is needed. Martorano (2006) operationa-
lises the concept of committee autonomy by an additive index of 11
procedures. This is also taken into consideration in the study at hand. The
data for this part builds on an original data set of formal committee structures.
Data were collected on variables which provide detailed information on the
size, jurisdiction and rights of the committee system in each legislature.
The primary sources for data acquisition were standing orders and rules of
procedures of the respective parliaments, which were obtained via the parlia-
mentary websites. For several indicators which are not based on standing
orders (i.e. the number of staff) parliamentary websites were consulted.
After completing the overview, country experts were asked via an online
survey in late 2013, with single reminders in early 2014, to review the data,
and to minimise any possible biases/misinterpretations of the rules.2 In case
the experts contradicted existing information expert judgement prevailed. If
country experts of the same country contradicted each other, the information
was checked again and a final decision was made by the author.
The index of ‘committee autonomy’ was constructed using this infor-
mation.3 Each of the 27 items included was first rank-ordered according to
the lowest amount of autonomy granted to a committee to the highest level
of autonomy. As an example, the itemmeasuring whether simultaneous meet-
ings with the plenum are allowed has three levels (0 = not possible at all, 1 =
possible under certain circumstances with special permission (from the
plenum, Speaker, etc.), 2 = always possible; with 0 being the lowest level of
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autonomy). Another example would be whether committees are able to
recruit their chairpersons from within the committee (0 = no, 1 = yes).
More complex items have more levels, i.e. the control of a committee’s time-
table varies between the government setting out the deadline via a motion
(ranked as ‘0’, indicating the least amount of autonomy) to parliamentary
actors which are not on the committee (Speaker, etc. = 1) to the chairperson
of the committee (2) to the committee members themselves with no right of
recall by the plenum (highest rank of autonomy = 3). Subsequently, each item
was scaled to an interval between 0 and 1. The overall score of autonomy is the
mean of the ranked score of all included items. Table 1 lists the items and how
these indicators measure the autonomy of the committees.
The aggregate autonomy scores of each legislature are shown in Figure 1
(mean autonomy score = 0.58). The individual scores for each analysed legis-
lature can be found in the Appendix. Looking at the individual country scores
it is noticeable that they are somewhat clustered (ranging from 0.305 in the
House of Commons of the United Kingdom to 0.748 in the Swedish
Riksdag). This is due to the fact that no committee system of the analysed leg-
islatures consistently scores low on all measured items or was assigned the
maximum value on all measured items. To illustrate, we can turn to the
Swedish Riksdag as an example. The committee system of this legislature
scores with the maximum level of autonomy on numerous items: there are
no multiple membership restrictions for committee members, chairs are
selected by the committee itself, the same committees have been established
in the last two legislative periods, committees have the right to initiate
Figure 1. Committee autonomy scores in 30 legislatures.
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legislation and they have extensive rights to redraft legislation. Furthermore, it
allows for minority reports to be drafted. After the committee stage of bills,
the document that is discussed is the bill including the considerations and
changes of the committee. Additionally, the number of staff is relatively
Table 1. List of items measuring the formal structures and operationalisation of
committee autonomy.
Question Less autonomy ↔ More autonomy
Number permanent committees (legislative per
function/specialised/non-legislative)?
Not used for index
Number ad hoc committees (no legislation/
legislation)?
Not used for index
How many joint committees exist? Not used for index
Does the Committee of the Whole House exist? Yes ↔ No
Do restrictions exist with regard to the size of
committees?
Not used for index
What is the min. and max. size of ad hoc
committees?
Not used for index
What is the min. and max. size of permanent
committees?
Not used for index
Are committees jurisdictional to ministerial
portfolios?
Subject based, crude coverage ↔ Complete
correspondence
Do multiple membership restrictions exist (limit)? Yes ↔ No restrictions
Are substantive (non-procedural/administrative)
sub-committees used? How many?
Not possible ↔ Possible
Which body is formally involved in the assignments
of members to committees?
External group (e.g. whips) ↔ House
How are committee chairs formally selected? Speaker ↔ Vote in committee
How are chairs allocated to the PPGs? Only cabinet PPGs ↔ Proportional
Same committees established in the last 2 legislative
periods?
Substantive changes ↔ Yes
Are committee meetings public or private? Public ↔ Private
Are rights granted to publish minority reports? No ↔ Yes, automatically
How are bills allocated to committees? Minister, Speaker ↔ Board of Chairmen
When is the committee stage? After plenary debate ↔ Before debate
Do committees have the right to initiate legislation? Not possible ↔ Right exists
Can committees split or merge bills? Not possible ↔ Right exists
Do committees have the right to redraft legislation
or propose amendments?
No power to amend/redraft ↔ Extensive
amendment power
Do committees have the right to kill a bill? No ↔ Yes
Which document is considered by the plenum at the
end result of committee negotiation?
Original bill with proposed amendments ↔
Redrafted ‘clean’ bill; resolution recommendation
Who controls the committee’s timetable? Meetings regulated ↔ Committee (no right to
recall)
Is the committee able to appoint a rapporteur for a
bill?
No ↔ Yes
Can sessions of the committees be scheduled
simultaneously to plenary sessions?
No ↔ Yes
Do committees have their own staff? No ↔ Yes
Number of supporting staff for each committee? No support staff ↔ Highest number
Secretariat’s functions: administrative/research/
document preparation?
None ↔ Combination of all three
Do committees have the right to invite/compel
witnesses? If so, who are they allowed to compel?
Invite but not compel ↔ Compel unrestricted
Are committee hearings public or private? Public ↔ Private
Can committees demand documents from outside
parliament? If so, from whom?
Not possible ↔ Yes, unrestricted
PPGs: parliamentary party groups.
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high and the staff assists the committee in administrative tasks, research and
the preparation of documents. However, even in this legislature, there are
some limitations with regard to the analysed items: as an example, the com-
mittees’ jurisdiction does not have complete correspondence with ministerial
portfolios. Although there is broad coverage, most ministries are cross-
covered. The committee system, therefore, scores lower on this item than leg-
islatures in which complete correspondence is present. Committees in the
Riksdag also do not have the right to ‘kill a bill’ and do not have complete
control over their own timetable. The majority in the plenum has a right of
recall (some legislatures allow for no right of recall at all). Although commit-
tee meetings can be scheduled simultaneously with the plenary session, they
may only take place when the committee business is not part of the plenary
discussion. Additionally, while some legislatures have extensive rights to ask
for documents from all kinds of institutions, their right refers only to govern-
ment institutions. These examples illustrate why the Riksdag, although
scoring with the highest score in several items, does not achieve an overall
score of ‘1’.
The placement of countries here resembles prior comparative studies (e.g.
Martin, 2011, p. 353). Small differences can most likely be accounted for by
the larger number of items considered in this study and by the method of
calculating the index. There are some notable exceptions. The low score of
the Dutch Tweede Kamer might be surprising as it contradicts the findings
of Martin and Vanberg (2011, p. 50). Based on the formal characteristics the
low score is, however, not surprising. Looking at the included items, the
Dutch Tweede Kamer scores low on many included items. During the revi-
sion of laws committee meetings in the Tweede Kamer consist of written
questions and answers, while no amendments can be proposed or included
by the committee in a draft. Additionally, these committees do not possess
any rights to initiate, split or merge bills. On the other side of the ranking,
the committee system of the Swedish Riksdag consistently scores high on the
included issues. Committees have excessive redrafting rights, can split and
merge bills, have control over their own timetable and possess a high
number of staff, etc.
Operationalising the independent variables
Hypothesis 1: Using the ParlGov database (Döring & Manow, 2012), the
average seat share of government/cabinet parliamentary party groups was cal-
culated by aggregating the seat share of the governing parties (excluding care-
takers) of a particular country across all legislative periods since 1990. Data for
Israel were obtained from Carr (2014) and cross-checked with data from the
Election Guide database (Election Guide Database, 2014).4 The most recent
governments included were those formed in January 2013.
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Hypothesis 2: For the extent of personal vote incentives, rankings for all
countries were obtained from the data set compiled by Johnson and
Wallack (2012). Based on the four indicators5 proposed by Carey and
Shugart (1995), the data set ranks various institutional combinations accord-
ing to the relative value to legislators of personal reputations versus party
reputations.6
Hypothesis 3: The extent to which the electoral systems gives individual
MPs a clear connection to individual districts is measured via a mean district
magnitude score (number of seats in parliament divided by the number of
electoral districts). If all legislators are elected via simple plurality in single-
member districts, each legislator has a clear connection to a single district.
On the other ‘extreme’ are countries with a single electoral district (such as
the Israeli Knesset). Information on the number of districts per electoral
system was collected directly from parliamentary websites. No distinction
was made with regard to variation across districts. In the case of mixed-
member proportional systems the divisor is the sum of the number of
single-member districts and the number of districts in which members are
distributed via party lists. The divided score is skewed and therefore was
logged.
Hypothesis 4: A range of quantitative indicators of corporatism exists (for
an extended overview, see Kenworthy, 2000). A recent index by Jahn (2016)
covers all countries in my data set with the exception of Iceland. His corpor-
atism score is the result of a factor analysis of eight items to measure the level
of corporatism in a country (Jahn, 2016, p. 14). Owing to its coverage and the
high match with the ranking by Siaroff (1999), arguably one of the most
widely used measures of corporatism, the Jahn ranking was used for this
analysis. Data for Iceland was compensated with its score in the Siaroff
ranking.
Hypothesis 5: The number of bills per year was obtained through overview
lists of bills or search engines on parliamentary websites. All bills which were
introduced by legislators or groups of legislators (Private Member Bills), the
government, and committees were counted. The number of plenary sessions
per year was also gathered based on the information in parliamentary year-
books or databases. The time frame of the analysis is 25 years (January
1990–January 2015) but varies across cases (on average over a period of 15
years). Using these two indicators the overall ratio on the average number
of bills was calculated. The average number of bills varies considerably,
from around 29 per year in Malta to over 3500 in Sweden. The number for
Sweden seems extraordinarily high, but it is in line with earlier research
(see, e.g. Bergman & Bolin, 2011, p. 268). In this particular case the
number is inflated through the high number of Private Member Bills
(Swedish: motioner). The analysis will control for any bias caused by the
high number of bills in Sweden.
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Hypothesis 6: The number of government parties for each cabinet between
January 1990 (excluding supporting parties) until December 2012 was deter-
mined using the ParlGov database (Döring & Manow, 2012). Each cabinet
was then classified as single-party or coalition government. The final score
reflects the percentage of cabinets that were coalition cabinets.
Hypothesis 7: The ideological distances between coalition partners were
calculated using the ParlGov database (Döring & Manow, 2012). Care-
taker parties were excluded. The overall score is the mean between the
difference of highest and lowest scores in the left–right, state–market,
liberty–authority and the pro-anti EU dimensions across all governments
that were established after elections in January 1990 and December 2012.
Data for Israel were calculated based on the scores in Benoit and Laver
(2006).
Hypothesis 8:Data on the frequency of minority governments until Decem-
ber 2012 were collected from the ParlGov database (Döring & Manow, 2012).
Data for governments formed after 2012 were added by the author. For Israel,
the data were obtained from the website of the Knesset (Knesset, 2015). The
time frame of the analysis is 25 years (January 1990–January 2015). Each
government formed within this period was coded with respect to it being
supported by a minority of members in parliament or not.
Three control variables are used. The institutionalisation literature views
autonomous committees as a sign of a fully institutionalised legislature. In
their study on committees in post-communist parliaments, Olson and
Crowther (2002) argue that committees in legislatures of developed democra-
cies are ‘the prime organisational means by which parliaments act indepen-
dently of the executive’ (p. 3). It is expected that the level of autonomy
should be higher the more institutionalised a legislature is. The analysis
tests the effect of the number of years the country is classified as a parliamen-
tary democracy using information provided in the Polity IV Country Reports
(Marshall & Gurr, 2010). An additional control variable was included to test
the effect of bicameralism on the committee system. It is expected that a
bicameral legislature establishes committees with less autonomy, as the
upper chamber is already an additional controlling body. A third control
variable relates to the size of a parliament. Larger legislatures offer more
possibilities to relocate decisions from the plenary to committees and are
therefore expected to grant more autonomy to committees for efficiency
purposes. Information on the size of the legislatures was collected from the
websites of each parliament. Table 2 contains descriptive statistics on each
of the independent variables.
The analysis relies on a ‘snapshot’ of the dependent variable (the situation
of committee systems in 2013). Several shortcomings of this approach need to
be addressed. First of all, one might argue that committee systems evolve
gradually and by analysing the specific configuration in a given year it is
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possible to overlook gradual changes leading to this set-up. Despite the
reliance on averages over an extended period, a fundamental problem
remains with regard to the gap in the time period between the dependent
and the independent variables. It might very well be that committee structures
were changed in the past based on a specific background situation that legis-
lators in a parliament faced which go even further back than the averages used
in this study. Such considerations cannot be ruled out and they do pose a
problem with regard to the argument that is made in this analysis (despite
it being phrased in terms of correlation). Ideally, data would be needed
which lists when each committee feature was established and to use an inde-
pendent variable to represent it in the relevant period. However, it is very dif-
ficult to trace back all of the 20+ indicators I use for each of the 30 countries of
my study. Relying on a snapshot of committee systems in 2013 is, therefore, a
pragmatic choice with limitations. The analysis rests on the assumption that,
even though committee structures might have been changed based on the
background situation of a period which exceeds the analysed period, this
background situation has not changed drastically and can be analysed with
averages since 1990.
Second, by using several static variables it is possible to ‘miss’ the actual
relationship and make inferences with variables which do not have a connec-
tion to the establishment of the particular committee system. This is taken
into account by relying on averages over a longer period of time as much
as possible. As was argued above, the argument that is made in this paper
rests on the assumption that over time a match will be established between
the political situation and a parliament’s structure. Rather than assuming
causation, the analysis is based on the correlation between these factors and
committee autonomy by looking at average scores over a prolonged period
of time. This prevents outliers in a period biasing the result. By using averages
over several years, the independent variables capture a dynamic process in a
single static value.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the independent variables for the analysis of committee
structures.
Variable n Min. Max. Mean SD
Majority seat share 30 38.99 78.05 53.35 8.07
Reliance on ‘personal vote’ 30 1.00 10.33 4.14 3.16
Connection to districts (logged) 30 0.00 5.01 2.23 1.33
Corporatism 30 0 3.61 1.55 0.94
Rate bills/year 30 0.20 27.10 5.25 6.08
Percentage coalition cabinets 30 0.00 1.00 0.74 0.35
Ideology distance government parties 30 0.00 6.84 2.87 1.63
Frequency minority government 30 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.27
(log)Years parl. democracy 30 2.64 5.13 4.02 0.72
Bicameral 30 0 1 0.50 0.51
(log)Size 30 4.09 6.48 5.34 0.70
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Results: what explains the variation in committee structures?
For a first impression of the effect of the variables, bivariate models were run
and the data were plotted.7 Several predictor variables indicate a significant
effect. These relate to the average number of bills per plenary session
(Hypothesis 5 – informational), the level of corporatism (Hypothesis 4 –
distributive) and the percentage of the coalition cabinets as well as the ideo-
logical distance between government parties (Hypotheses 6 and 7 – coalition
logic). The other variables do not reach common significance levels.
For the main analysis, a multivariate linear regression model was fitted to
the data. The data structure allows for fitting an ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression as the general requirements for a linear regression model are met
by logging the skewed variables and testing for multicollinearity (which is
addressed further below). A problem occurs, however, on a more general
level: the number of hypotheses and predictors (nine variables) is high in
relation to the number of cases (30 cases). This is due to the theoretical
framework, which comprises four distinct theories, and the limited number
of available cases. In statistical terms, trying to estimate too many parameters
from a sample that is too small is referred to as ‘overfitting’. Doing so can pose
a real problem with regard to the inferences drawn from the models
(see Babyak, 2004).
In order to test the robustness of the results of the OLS regression, stepwise
selection of variables and lasso regression (an example of shrinkage models)
were used in this study (Hastie, Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2009).8 These
additional tests largely confirmed the outcome of the OLS regression
(which will be discussed below). This increases the confidence in the robust-
ness of the findings of the OLS model. The results of the multivariate OLS
models are presented in Table 3. The value of Cohen’s f2 (1.0 in Model 1)
shows a large effect of the independent variables.
The output of the OLS model which includes all variables and all 30 cases
(denoted as Model 1 in Table 3) indicates support for the ‘workload’ hypoth-
esis: legislatures with a higher workload establish committee systems with
greater autonomy. Even though the lasso regression hinted at an effect of
the level of corporatism (Hypothesis 4), the variable does not reach
common significance levels in the OLS model. This is also reflected in the sub-
stantive effect of the variable which is negligible. The difference between the
committee autonomy score of countries with the lowest score of corporatism
and the highest level of corporatism is 0.025 (0.582 for the least corporatist
countries and 0.607 for the most corporatist countries). There is no evidence
that variation in the connection between individual legislators and constitu-
encies (Hypothesis 3) is positively related to the level of committee autonomy.
Although the coefficient is in the expected direction, the effect is not signifi-
cant. The results further show no sign of support for the argument that
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electoral rules which allow legislators to rely more on ‘personal votes’
(Hypothesis 2) are positively related to the autonomy of committee
systems. The variable which is associated with a partisan rationale indicates
Table 3. Results of the analysis of committee autonomy scores (upper table: bivariate
linear regression; lower table: multiple linear regression models).
Results of bivariate linear regression model for
committee autonomy scores
Dependent variable: committee autonomy
Variable Constant SD Coefficient SD
Majority seat share 0.545*** (0.137) 0.001 (0.003)
Reliance on ‘personal vote’ 0.612*** (0.033) −0.008 (0.006)
Connection to districts (logged) 0.552*** (0.039) 0.013 (0.020)
Corporatism 0.512*** (0.036) 0.044** (0.020)
Rate bills/year 0.533*** (0.023) 0.009*** (0.003)
Percentage coalition cabinets 0.486*** (0.043) 0.127** (0.052)
Ideology distance of government PPGs 0.478*** (0.035) 0.036*** (0.011)
Frequency minority government 0.567*** (0.030) 0.045 (0.074)
Results of multiple linear regression model for committee
autonomy scores
Dependent variable: committee autonomy
Model 1 Model 1A Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Majority seat share −0.000
(0.003)
−0.001
(0.003)
0.001
(0.005)
−0.001
(0.004)
0.001
(0.003)
Personal vote −0.007
(0.006)
−0.008
(0.007)
−0.008
(0.008)
−0.008
(0.007)
−0.007
(0.007)
(log)Connection to districts −0.018
(0.016)
−0.018
(0.026)
−0.013
(0.020)
−0.016
(0.016)
−0.013
(0.016)
Level of corporatism 0.009
(0.023)
0.009
(0.026)
0.020
(0.033)
0.011
(0.025)
0.006
(0.024)
Rate bills/year 0.007**
(0.003)
0.007*
(0.004)
0.008*
(0.004)
0.007*
(0.003)
0.009**
(0.003)
Vote share governing party/coalition 0.039
(0.074)
0.046
(0.109)
0.033
(0.130)
0.104*
(0.060)
Ideology distance of government PPGs 0.023
(0.017)
0.025
(0.019)
0.021
(0.022)
0.026
(0.017)
Frequency of minority governments 0.027
(0.093)
−0.020
(0.113)
0.069
(0.124)
−0.018
(0.110)
0.048
(0.094)
Years democracy(logged) −0.040
(0.124)
Bicameral 0.015
(0.058)
Size(logged) 0.010
(0.037)
Constant 0.494**
(0.200)
0.560**
(0.230)
0.514**
(0.359)
0.516**
(0.209)
0.439**
(0.200)
Observations 30 26 26 26 30
R2 0.500 0.406 0.465 0.399 0.452
Adjusted R2 0.310 0.126 0.044 0.166 0.278
Residual standard error 0.090 0.096 0.101 0.094 0.092
F Statistic 2.63 1.45 1.83 1.71 2.59
df 21 17 14 18 22
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
PPGs: parliamentary party groups.
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an even weaker effect. Autonomous committees can be found in legislatures
with both a large and a small average seat share of the majority parliamentary
party group or coalition. Surprisingly, the two variables related to the coalition
logic do not significantly predict committee autonomy in the full model,
either. An additional model (Model 1A) was run with all variables but exclud-
ing those cases which have experienced only single-party governments in the
period of examination (Canada, Greece, Malta, and Spain). This was done to
check whether the variable regarding the ideological distance between
the governing parties (which was scored with a zero in these cases) biases
the result. This new analysis does not change the significance of any of the
variables. Rate of bills remains the only statistically significant variable
(p = .055). The effect of this variable is substantial. The country with the
lowest rate of bills has a predicted committee autonomy of 0.579; the
highest rate of bills predicts a committee autonomy score of 0.7252.
The results for the coalition logic variables in the complete models are
striking, given their initial predictive power in the bivariate models. After
looking more closely at the inter-correlations between predictor variables,
the presence of coalitions and the ideological distance between governing
parties appear highly correlated (Pearson’s r = .726). In order to account for
this, two additional models were run. These are listed as Models 3 and 4 in
Table 3.
When excluding the variable measuring the vote share of coalitions
(Model 3), the variable concerning the ideological distance still fails to pass
common significance levels (p = .152). However, when excluding the ideologi-
cal distance (Model 4) the variable concerning coalitions reaches the 10 per
cent significance level (p = .095). The rate of bills remains significant (p = .053,
Model 3; p = .011, Model 4). These extra checks provide support for the
‘keeping tabs on coalition partners’ function of committees that was proposed
by Martin and Vanberg (2011). With regard to the substantial effect, in
countries which experience coalitions in every legislative period under inves-
tigation the committee autonomy is, holding all other factors constant, pre-
dicted to be 10 per cent higher than in countries where no coalition
government is formed. The predicted value increases from 0.503 (no
coalitions formed) to 0.607 (coalitions formed in all legislative periods).
Unsurprisingly, a high correlation is also visible between the variables
measuring the frequency of minority governments and the percentage of
coalition governments (Pearson’s r = .71). However, additional models
excluding one of these variables did not lead to significant results of the
remaining variable.
Regarding the control variables (see Model 2 in Table 3), committee
autonomy does not vary systematically with the number of years since tran-
sition to democratic rule. There is little evidence to assume, based on this
analysis, that committee systems in parliaments by nature have little
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autonomy in the beginning. Committee systems in more recent democracies
vary with regard to their autonomy as much as they do in established
democracies. It can rather be argued that legislatures in new democracies
‘copy’ structures of established legislatures when setting up their formal
rules. Similarly, bicameralism does not prove to be a predictor of higher
levels of committee autonomy. The size of a legislature is not connected
to committee autonomy, either.
When inspecting the model the influence of the number of bills per plenary
session is striking. Several additional tests were conducted to check whether
Sweden ‘drives’ the results. First, the variable measuring the rate of bills
was logged. This does not change the significance levels of the model. The
rate of bills per plenary session still remains significant (p = .009 in the
model including all theory-related variables and p = .012 in the model includ-
ing the control variables). As a further check Sweden was excluded from the
analysis. When excluding Sweden (again also excluding the countries which
have experienced single-party governments in all legislative periods under
investigation) the variable measuring the ideological distance does not pass
common significant levels (p = .162), while the logged rate of bills remains sig-
nificant (p = .064). Similarly, when the percentage of coalitions is entered as
the only coalition-logic-related variable, it fails to pass significance levels
(logged rate of bills p = .063). Further excluding the variable measuring the
rate of minority government does not change the outcome. Even with
the exclusion of Sweden, the substantial effect of the variable measuring the
rate of bills is sizeable. The predicted committee autonomy score for countries
which face a very low workload is 0.513, while those parliaments with the
highest workload are predicted to have a committee autonomy score of 0.667.
Conclusion: informational gains and coalition logic
Strong committees have traditionally been associated more with legislatures
which have weak parliamentary party groups (such as the US Congress),
rather than with legislatures of parliamentary systems. This view misses,
however, the more nuanced picture. Almost all legislatures around the
world rely on committees in their daily operation. There is great variation
with regard to the internal organisation across legislatures. Several legislatures
outside the US have established highly comprehensive and effective commit-
tee systems. This provides us with the possibility to analyse the underlying
rationale of why legislatures are organised in the way they are. Using this as
a starting point, the article has addressed the main research question: ‘what
factors account for the variation in formal committee structures’?
The study has analysed the committee systems of 30 legislatures which
have varying degrees of strong parliamentary party groups using the central
hypotheses of the ‘keeping tabs on coalition partners’ logic of committees
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proposed by Martin and Vanberg (2011) and the congressional theories.
Research on legislative organisation outside the US is still in the early
stages of development, which is why it is important to take the long-standing
theoretical debate in the US into consideration when conducting our analyses.
The analysis has summarised formal committee structures under the
concept of committee autonomy, measured by a multi-item index based on
an original data set. No distinction was made with regard to the importance
of the different items. One might not agree with the choice to treat all items in
this way and argue that some features weigh in heavier, i.e. an existing right to
initiate legislation. Committee autonomy is a multi-faceted concept and the
measured items are underlying dimensions of it. The literature itself also
did not provide a clear indication on how to weigh the individual elements.
Future research should build on this issue and provide additional analyses.
The data set built up in this study provides a starting point to construct
other measurements, for example by focusing on the two dimensions distin-
guished by Mattson and Strøm (1995) (drafting authority and agenda
control). The data were analysed by fitting an OLS regression model. The
problem regarding the relatively low number of cases and the high number
of variables was addressed by robustness checks (stepwise selection and
lasso regression) and analyses under different circumstances. Both show
that the results are relatively robust. This increases the confidence in the
results of the models, despite the relatively low number of cases.
The results indicate support for two theoretical perspectives. The data sup-
ports one of the hypotheses deduced from the coalition logic perspective.
When the government consists of multiple parties on a regular basis (Hypoth-
esis 6), the committee system tends to be more autonomous. The workload of
a parliament (deduced from the informational theory, Hypothesis 5) is the
best predictor to account for the variation in committee autonomy. A
higher workload that a parliament faces is positively related to a more auton-
omous committee system.
The bivariate models, the lasso regression as well as the stepwise selection
hinted at a correlation between the level of autonomy of a legislature’s com-
mittee system and how corporatist a country is as well as the ideological
difference between coalition partners, but the OLS regression did not show
this effect. Variables which tested a distributional and partisan rationale (dis-
trict magnitude score and the majority parliamentary party group(s) seat
share) did not have a significant effect on committee autonomy. The effect
of (at least one of) the congressional rationales has important theoretical
implications. Some scholars argued that the study of committees needs to
evolve from relying too much on the congressional theories (Hansen, 2011;
Yordanova, 2011). It is certainly true that the coalition logic perspective by
Martin and Vanberg should be a central building block in our endeavour to
understand better how legislatures organise their work. Two of the
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congressional theories did not help us to understand the formal committee
structures. Nevertheless, for this analysis, the informational theory provided
additional insight. By focusing solely on the government formation-driven
argument proposed by the model of Martin and Vanberg, we might overlook
important structural and political features. The informational theory high-
lighted an important factor which would otherwise have been neglected
and was a valuable addition to the framework.
The study is limited due to the restriction to formal committee character-
istics. By focusing only on the structural features little can be said about the
daily operations and workings of committees in the legislatures and the
level of autonomy of individual legislators. Next to factors such as particular
legislative–executive relationships, parliamentary party groups in the analysed
legislatures are gatekeepers and put powerful constraints on their members.
Actual committee members’ autonomy is never entirely free of other con-
siderations. However, no good estimates are available to measure autonomy
during the decision-making processes, while formal committee structures
can be measured. Future studies need to give more insight into the restrictions
of parliamentary party group organisations on individual legislators in com-
mittees and the relationship between committee members and parliamentary
party groups.
Notes
1. The following cases are included (LH = Lower House in the case of bicameral
legislatures): Austria: NationalratLH; Belgium: Kamer van Volksvertegenwoor-
digersLH; Canada: House of CommonsLH; Czech Republic: Poslanecká sněmov-
naLH; Denmark: Folketing; Estonia: Riigikogu; Finland: Eduskunta; France:
Assemblée NationaleLH; Germany: BundestagLH; Greece: Vouli ton Ellinon;
Hungary: Országház; Iceland: Althing; Ireland: (Dáil Éireann)LH; Israel:
Knesset; Italy: Camera dei DeputatiLH; Japan: ShūgiinLH; Latvia: Saeima;
Lithuania: Seimas; Luxembourg: Chambre des Députés;Malta: House of Repre-
sentatives; The Netherlands: Tweede KamerLH; Norway: Storting; Poland: Sejm
Rzeczypospolitej PolskiejLH; Portugal: Assembleia da República; Slovakia:
Národná rada; Slovenia: Dr˘zavni zborLH; Spain: Congreso de los DisputadosLH;
Sweden: Riksdag; Switzerland: NationalratLH; United Kingdom: House of Com-
monsLH.
Initially, data were also gathered for Australia: House of RepresentativesLH,
Croatia: Hrvatski sabor and New Zealand: House of Representatives. Unfortu-
nately, country experts have been unable to check the data for these legislatures
yet. These three countries therefore had to be excluded from the analysis.
2. For checking the individual country data I am deeply indebted to Wolfgang
C. Müller, Sam Depauw, Christopher D. Raymond, Zdenka Mansfeldová,
Martin Ejnar Hansen, Vello Pettai, Mihkel Solvak, Matti Wiberg, Olivier
Costa, Theodore Chatzipantelis, Gabriella Ilonszki, Shane Martin, Reuven
Hazan, Marco Giuliani, Naofumi Fujimura, Janis Ikstens, Alvidas Lukošaitis,
Cynthia van Vonno, Knut Heidar, Agnieszka Dudzińska, Ana Belchior,
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Marek Rybář, Miro Haček, Magnus Hagevi, Juan Rodríguez Teruel, Adrian
Vatter, and Phil Larkin (order of names based on alphabetical order of
countries).
3. Initially the data were analysed in order to extract multiple dimensions by
means of a principal component analysis, but the results did not indicate any
meaningful unobserved factors.
4. The status as coalition-PPG was only given in case parliamentary party groups
joined the coalition right after the election.
5. (1) The degree of control parliamentary party group leaders exercise over ballot
rank in list systems, (2) whether votes cast in the general election are pooled
across entire parties, (3) the number and types of votes cast and (4) district
magnitude.
6. The results presented in this paper use the rank of the tier with the greatest
incentives to cultivate a personal vote (denoted PERS_ RANK). Models with
the other ranking which ranks countries according to their most populous
tier (DOM_ RANK) presented similar results.
7. Plots for these variables can be obtained from the author on request.
8. The output can be obtained from the author.
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Appendix
Table A1. Committee autonomy scores of each analysed legislature.
Country Legislature Committee autonomy score
Austria Nationalrat 0.667
Belgium Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers 0.702
Canada House of Commons 0.527
Czech Republic Poslanecká sněmovna Parlamentu České republiky 0.488
Denmark Folketing 0.562
Estonia Riigikogu 0.642
Finland Eduskunta 0.663
France Assemblée nationale 0.521
Germany Bundestag 0.712
Greece Voulí ton Ellínon 0.463
Hungary Országgyűlés 0.562
Iceland Alþingi 0.605
Ireland Dáil Éireann 0.441
Israel Knesset 0.594
Italy Camera dei deputati 0.710
Japan Shūgiin 0.637
Latvia Saeima 0.660
Lithuania Seimas 0.679
Luxembourg Chambre des Députés 0.543
Malta House of Representatives 0.355
Netherlands Tweede Kamer 0.396
Norway Storting 0.689
Poland Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 0.573
Portugal Assembleia da República 0.549
Slovakia Národná rada 0.536
Slovenia Državni zbor 0.577
Spain Congreso de los Diputados 0.522
Sweden Riksdag 0.748
Switzerland Nationalrat 0.687
United Kingdom House of Commons of the United Kingdom 0.305
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